The welfare dependence in the Czech Republic

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Publikace nespadá pod Pedagogickou fakultu, ale pod Ekonomicko-správní fakultu. Oficiální stránka publikace je na webu

GUZI Martin

Rok publikování 2014
Druh Článek ve sborníku
Konference Proceedings of the 19th International Conference – Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Public Finance 2014
Fakulta / Pracoviště MU

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

Obor Ekonomie
Klíčová slova welfare trap; net replacement rate; work incentives
Popis The interaction of tax and social security systems defines the disposable income of individual and therefore influences the decision of unemployed to accept a job. The central argument of the paper is that income available from social welfare system in the Czech Republic is overly generous for some groups and leads to the long-term unemployment. Work incentives are most weakened through the withdrawal of means-tested benefits and tax credits, while high rates of income tax play a minor role. The policy reform of social system is needed to balance redistributive aims with work incentives and refocus incentives towards transition to work. This can be achieved with (i) the increase of the statutory minimum wage; (ii) the decrease of marginal tax rate for low-income earners; (iii) the phasing out of social benefits for some period instead of the sharp withdrawal of benefits. Ultimately a better harmonization of tax and social security systems in the direction of fewer social welfare programs and lower marginal tax rates will ensure that the incentives to leave unemployment are not hampered by high social benefits.
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