

SOCIABILITY IN CONTEXT OF HEALTH SUPPORT AT SCHOOL

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Abstract: *Problems of support of healthy interpersonal relationships are closely connected with personal moral issues (the personal moral development) and pro-social behaviour (its facilitation). Biopsychosocial model of health has unquestionably also ethical dimension. In this contribution we discuss various concepts of moral development and some protective and risky pedagogical-psychological elements of the personal moral development; we also indicate possibilities how to support the very complicated way of a human to health – in sense of moral maturity and sociability. We mention the support of pro-social behaviour of children, too and its connection with prevention of bullying in child groups.*

Key words: *sociability, pro-social behaviour, personal moral, bullying prevention, “silent majority”, conformance, moral development, various psychological concepts of sociability development, facilitation of pro-social behaviour of children, fair community at school.*

The terms **pro-social behaviour**, altruism and the like are not defined by all psychologists in the same way. By Nakonečný (1995: 105) “*pro-social behaviour (or ‘helping behaviour’)* is another concept from the motivation field of the social behaviour defined as *altruism*”. Pro-social behaviour is a behaviour in favour of another person; it is often (but not always) connected with a personal sacrifice. **Sociability** can be defined as readiness for such behaviour. Here we give several examples for the term pro-social behaviour: e.g. E. Staub (1982) takes the pro-social behaviour as *behaviour which brings benefit to other people*, J. Reykowski (1978) describes the pro-social behaviour as *activity of an individual focused on protection, support or state improvement of an external social object (a person, a group or a social institution)*, N. Eisenberg (1986) defines the pro-social behaviour as *behaviour connected with activities that are developed with purpose to help or to assist another person or a group of persons, without a reward anticipated by a helping/assisting person*¹.

¹ There are a little bit difficulties with the request to not anticipate a reward because in psychological sense of the word the reward can be also a good feeling of a person connected with a given assistance; however, it is related with the question how identification with an object of assistance and the following positive experience motivate to the pro-social behaviour.

A specific type of the pro-social behaviour is **assistance for another person in need**. Here we can remind a real life story which was written to the history of social psychology. Public and psychology specialists were alerted and psychological research studies of the pro-social behaviour were started consequently: a person was provided with no assistance in situation of extreme need:

In March 1964 the New York Times front-page described a murder in one of New York's quarter: Kitty Genovese, a young barman, was to knifed to death by a man who had not know her and formerly killed two other women. This crime was horrifying because the crime action lasted half an hour. The murderer stabbed the victim, after several minutes he returned and stabbed her again, left and again returned to stab again. During this time the victim cried and called for help. 38 witnesses saw and heard her but nobody tried to protect her, did not help her, nobody intervened by calling the police (one of the observers called the police finally, when the victim was already dead) (by Hunt, 2000).

Psychologists started dealing with external and internal factors of motivation of the pro-social behaviour. Apparently incomprehensible behaviour of the people that wordlessly watched the violence being done to the defenceless individual – silent majority, the people that could be a decisive power in similar situations and could the whole inauspicious course reverse – it can be partially explained by such readiness to help another person, which has been influenced and substantially variable on facts of a certain situation, so it depends on external factors.² E.g. it is decreased if other person are attended, which, in social psychology, can be explained by phenomenon of division of responsibility (or diffusion of responsibility): each of individuals feels to be less responsible in an acute, help-needed situation because anybody else bears the same part of responsibility for providing help.

In our contribution we follow internal (motivating) factor of the pro-social behaviour. Psychologists specialized in this subject (e.g. Eisenberg, Hoffmann, Staub, Reykowski, Karylowski etc.) agree that two principle motivation sources of the pro-social behaviour can be distinguished (without mutual conflict)³:

- One of those motivation sources is **personal moral**; here the motivation consists in acceptance of moral norms and values that support person's certitude concerning rightness of the pro-social behaviour.

² Unfortunately, situations of tragic disregard of observers and non-provision of assistance for a person in extreme need are not isolated also in our country; to the contrary, an alarming fact is an increasing number of those situations. Here we describe an incident that took place in Brno several years ago: three skinheads attacked a student who made remarks to their dull racist shouts. They stabbed and threw the heavy wounded student out of the bus at the bus station. Many people went with the bus in this time but nobody took either any action or left the bus to help the injured person.

³ This differentiation has an interesting connection with a "male" and "female" interpretation of personal moral (see the next text).

- The second motivation source of the pro-social behaviour is **empathy** with needs of another person⁴.

In the school environment the pro-sociality (or the pro-sociality level) is a powerful collective factor influencing healthy relationships among children; it is a necessary precondition of healthy actions in child groups and it can play a decisive role in prevention of some socio-pathological effects; it is also related to **bullying prevention**⁵. Socio-psychological constellation of the “the third force“ is a significant moment in a group dynamic of bullying among children (e.g. besides personal characteristics of aggressors and victims or other factors), i.e. groups of children that are not either initiators or victims but they can influence the whole situation of the group in substantial, often decisive way. They can be the “silent majority“ indifferently watching harassment of a classmate, or they can switch from urging to harassment to active cooperation; on the contrary, they can be a source of a healthy „immune“ answer to bullying and an autorecue potential of an ill group. Pressure of pathological group norms of bullying is more effective in conditions of higher tendency to conformity, i.e. to a dependent, unfree behaviour. A conforming individual yields to the group violence more easily. Unfortunately in some classes, particularly with excessively autocratic style of supervision, this risky factor is directly fostered. In the group with developed bullying there is a risky constellation of attitude of individual pupils not only to bullying but mere generally to the violence against a weaker individual. Pupils seem to have no compassion⁶ and no perception of classmate’s suffering, but by the pathological norms of the group this deficit of empathy is taken as “normal“. Prevailing conformity along with a low social pro-sociality of children is the risky factor of bullying in child groups, whereas the protective factor is prevailing autonomy with pro-sociality. This aspect plays a role in all phases of bullying development. Sufficiently autonomous individuals can obstruct continuing violence and, on the contrary, conformity of the majority decides indirectly “in silence“ that social destruction can be deepened. From this point of view, the pro-sociality level of children in the class is of crucial importance. Implication in the field of bullying prevention is possibility to develop the prevention based on strategy of facilitation of pro-social behaviour of children and their moral development. In this respect for personal development of a person, his/her own internalized social experience

⁴ J. Reykowski formulated and J. Karylowski confirmed the hypothesis by that the readiness of a subject to assist other person is higher if the person is perceived as a similar one to the subject. E.g. Karylowski (1973) found the girls more active in assistance for those girls-colleagues that are of similar opinion (in: Nakonečný, 1993: 224).

⁵ Given links are adequately general and can be applied to almost any form of asymmetric aggression (i.e. simplifiedly - „aggression of a strong subject against a weak one“)

⁶ Here certainly socio-cultural connections play a role, e.g. influence of media. “*TV, PC games, printed materials etc. overstuff children and youth with violence. Compassion, suffering and conscience are not shown believably in major part of the offered production* (Kolář, 1997: 66)“. This influence, which also includes dangerous identification of masculinity with aggressiveness and readiness to use violence, is really also significant but we do not discuss it here because of the above given topic of this article (even if risky factors of this sort would be worthy of detailed disquisition).

is decisive, obtained in institutions that influence him/her or groups he/she is living in. Of course, the most significant group is the family. Without any doubt the school also plays the key role and for a pupil the class is very important group from viewpoint of social learning. Just at school the pupil can “learn“ that assistance for other people has a sense (double quotes should here indicate that we emphasize not only intentional but also unintentional learning), particularly the assistance for those in need, e.g. the weaker or “different“ persons etc., that cooperation can bring pleasure, different persons can have different opinions without loss of mutual respect, it is possible to learn that a real dialog should be preferred to a power fight of monologs etc. On the other hand, they can also obtain experience that the assistance does not pay, that strong individuals can harm the weaker persons without punishment, that different opinions on the same thing can be challenge for a fight, not for a dialog, that it is better to be in good relationships with powerful individuals and “when in Rome do as the Romans do“, that cooperation has no purpose because a decisive fact is to succeed in competition and to be better than the others. Humans have dispositions to pro-social actions but in ontogenesis the development of this disposition is considerably problematic (analogically to the personal moral development). For this point of view, i.e. in the context with development of dispositions in interaction with environment, the moral development is the most variable, so pedagogically-psychologically the most problematic one (sure more than the physical or cognitive development).

Psychologists take moral norms and values as more or less learned structures; of course, it is not appropriate to consider heredity in this connection⁷. Social norms, ethical principles, laws, value systems are passed to the child directly, by intentional educational activities, and unintentionally – by indirect impact of child’s social environment. The child is internalizing them by means of parents (they are the most important social models) and other significant key persons in the broad family, further by means of teachers, coeval groups and later on by means of more general socio-cultural influences (inclusive mass media). Very important issue (which is more or less still open) is, **what way is used for realization of the moral development**; this question has certainly a pedagogical dimension because it implicitly comprises also the issue of pro-sociality supporting factors. Naturally, there are several concepts of the personal moral development.

One of the first important psychological answer to this issue was contained in the **Freud’s** structural *theory* (presented by Freud in his work *Ego and Id* in 1923), in his theoretical scheme dividing the mental apparatus in Id, Ego and Superego⁸. **Superego** is (in Freud’s psychoanalytical concept) a mental instance which represents social norms, prohibitions and commands internalized by an individual. Child’s moral attitudes result just from this instance, namely by internalization of moral norms that are impressed firstly by parents, later on by the other persons important for the child.

⁷ May be, with exception of the so called social heredity which is discussed in connection with phenomenon of transgeneration transfer of certain formulas of behaviour, attitudes, values, norms etc. Here it is taken more in a figurative meaning, no heredity in the literal sense of word.

⁸ As a matter of interest we would like to mention that by Freud the predecessor of the term Superego is the term Ego-Ideal. The term Superego is a result of polemics between Freud and Alfred Adler, Freud’s follower.

Superego is formed in a long and complicated process which begins in the so called phallic (or oedipal) periods in Freud's periodization of the mental development of the child (approximately from the age of 4 years); only in this period of the child life the proper conditions exist for existence of the internalization process in cognitive development. The internalized objects (and later on also others) become a permanent part of the child mind, with their norms, values, wishes and imperatives. Consequently the child, after going in an action beyond the limits of the internalized norms, is "reproved" by the Superego internal voice and the child **feels guilty** about it. Therefore constitution of Superego instantiation is a significant milestone in the moral development of an individual and his/her socialization in general, because, on the contrary to the previous period, the individual's actions are not determined only "from the outside", i.e. by direct influence of the presented parent, but he/she start to regulate his/her actions "from the inside". "*Superego is, in point of fact, a small private universe reflecting the ethics and moral of the world in each of individuals* (Černoušek, 1996: 101)". The term Superego still exists in the psychoanalytical vocabulary⁹; it is not used by the psychologists dealing with the individual's moral development, who are not oriented to psychoanalysis, in spite of it it is a base of the very useful model which can demonstrate a process that can be called as the development of the sense of moral. For that matter **the interiorization principle is not missing in any of the following significant concepts of the moral development.** The way to "the moral law in us" has its evolutionary regularities and it can be characterized simplifiedly as the interiorization process of „the moral outside us“. To the inspiring Freud's model¹⁰ we would like to remark that Superego is a complex of two parts, namely the part of *conscience*, which represents the punishing parental function and can evoke feelings of guilt in the individual by incorrect actions, and the part *Ego-Ideal*, which, on the contrary, gives feelings of satisfaction of the „well“ behaved child. In this way, Ego-Ideal can mediate the child's conception of his/her own image. Hence Superego contains not only protections of a "bad" behaviour and various restrictions ordered by parents and other important authorities but also rewards and commendations for a "good" behaviour because Ego-Ideal represents the rewarding and commending parental function. Also the pedagogical aspect of this concept is important. In brief, Superego can bring inadequate experience of guilt, insufficiency and disturbed self-interpretation, which can be psychological reason of prevailing depressive experiences. Those mental problems can result in neurotic troubles. On the contrary, if Superego is developed insufficiently, an individual may not be able to feel guilty even in serious moral offences. In psychopathology we can find the utmost variant of this possibility among some personality disorders. No wonder that among impulses for pedagogy coming from psychoanalysis there is also warning, which probably seems obvious today, namely warning against harmfulness of extreme educational styles and in parallel also an implicit request of self-reflection of those persons dealing with education of children (not only parents, but also teachers, instructors, etc.).

⁹ Besides that, it became "popular", similarly as other psychoanalytical terms, i.e. it passed the border of professional terminology and penetrated into the common language.

¹⁰ Freud's model of three mental systems we see as a very inspiring one (however obsolete), also in the present time if we take it as an excellent metaphor enriching psychological thinking.

Jean Piaget, a well known Swiss developmental psychologist, is the author of probably the most known concept of the moral development coming from intensive studies of child's thinking. His most important contribution to developmental psychology was a phenomenological attitude to studies of the child development; he tried to understand the child world from the child's point of view. In 1932 he issued the still-inspiring work "The Moral Judgment of the Child"¹¹. Piaget's concept of the child moral development was initially based on interviews and observation of about 100 children of pre-school and school age. The children were asked for their comprehension of rules for playing marbles¹² and they were observed directly by the play (not only by playing marbles but also by other plays): "*We took notice about analysis of collective plays of children, when they are bounded by the fair-play conscience (Piaget, 1932: VII)*". Besides that, Piaget prepared short stories to the children, where he stimulated situations for considering justice, punishment, authority and moral offences, e.g. lie, thefts, "disobedience" etc. (moral dilemmas for those children). Children responded to such stories, that seemed to be ridiculous and trivial for adults, but from child reactions an observer could learn many details about the child's considerations. By means of responds to those stories (mainly by substantiations of child answers) and by the child's understanding of the sense of those stories, the child conception of punishment, guilty, justice and personal moral features can be evaluated. Piaget found two types of the moral, qualitatively different; based on this finding he distinguished two stages of the child moral development¹³. By J. Piaget the stage of the moral development of an individual is determined by a degree of internalization of social norms and values and dependence on external control of behaviour. In this sense, the development takes a fairly long time. The development of conscience is a life long process. We would like to quote here the quite clear and also critical expression of autonomous moral by Piaget: "*Considering our present pedagogical system, we can claim that 'a good boy' has all preconditions to be the same in his whole life, while 'virtuous sheep' grow into a narrow-minded persons that prefer moralism to humanity.*" (Piaget, 1932, In Heidbrink, 1997: 65)

Piaget conception has continued in works of **Lawrence Kohlberg**, an American psychologist. From 50ies of the last century he has elaborated the stages of the moral

¹¹ "Le jugement moral chez l'enfant"; unfortunately, the work was not translated to Czech.

¹² For analysis of child moral and development of awareness of rules Piaget intentionally uses the system of rules which was created by the children themselves, namely the rules of playing marbles.

¹³ Heteronomous stadium (**heteronomous moral**) can be specified by child behaviour that depends on an external control, reward or punishment. Heteronomous moral comes from pressure of adults. Child behaviour is determined by the others, by commands, restrictions and prohibitions given by adults, mainly by parents or other key persons in the family, teachers, etc. Actions (own and those of other people) are evaluated by the child according to statements of the adults – as permitted (approved) or prohibited, punished manners. Later on (at the beginning of the school age) the moral development is changed qualitatively – the heteronomous moral is changed to the **autonomous moral** (its rudiments, i.e. the first demonstrations of the autonomous moral can appear in pre-school age); this stage of the moral development is indicated as the autonomous one. The child evaluates a certain actions as proper or improper manners, without adult authority and is identified with behaviour norms to that extent that behaves according them without any external control.

consideration in connection with development of cognitive structures and extrapolated Piaget's conclusions to the period of adolescence and adult age. Individual stages of the moral development express specific relations of individuals to norms and consequent behaviour. In construction of the individual stages of the moral development Kohlberg initially worked with behaviour of a human in an inner conflict situation. Therefore he presented moral dilemmas in the form of short stories to investigated persons and based on their answers (about their behaviour in a certain situation and possible reason of that behaviour) he formulate three main stages of the moral development (pre-conventional, conventional, post-conventional)¹⁴, with two partial levels in each of the stages. The answers were classified in the corresponding stage of development according to the reason giving way for a certain type of behaviour in a certain situation. Here the moral development stage is deduced from motives of actions. In a simplified way we can say that those motives are successively: at first the own need satisfaction, then the respect for social roles and finally the congruence of behaviour and personal conscience/accepted principles (e.g. respect for life)¹⁵. In this connection it is necessary to emphasize that the moral development can be problematic, from the viewpoint of precondition that in a certain age it can reach a certain stage. In the moral development people can stagnate at a level corresponding to the child age, similarly to the situation when many people do not reach the level of formal operations in the cognitive development. The **pre-conventional** stage corresponds e.g. with the moral development of some criminal recidivists, *“who are not in the least able to respect common social norms and must be punished repeatedly to avoid such behaviour”* (Vágnerová, 1997: 192).

- Stagnation in the **conventional** stage of the moral development can be described as the moral of “an obedient child” or “a good citizen” complying with norms, keeping commands of authorities etc. without considering their contents. It can lead to an extreme consequences if this moral type serves as ”a good cog in a wheel“ of a totalitarian system¹⁶, especially if commonly valid values and ethical principles are in dramatic disharmony with the norms and values preferred in a certain society. To illustrate this extreme, we here describe one of the most known “cog in a wheel“ of the Nazi system:

“Eichmann was not a demon or a monster but a caricature of his times, a strange product of the perverse regime. Probably he really and frankly believed that his deal was “to solve Jewish problem“; he had a well-developed sense of duty, order and discipline. In spite of his crimes he was not tried as a psychopathic, ruthless, cruel murdered but as a sedulous bureaucrat whose worst vice was conformity; he, committed for the Israel trial, behaved in the same manner as in the Nazi regime. He did not show any mark of a strong ideological belief or any wickedness. During the trial the only significant characteristic of his behaviour

¹⁴ Kohlberg's stages of the moral development are known to such extent that we consider this short description to be sufficient.

¹⁵ The basic moment of development is here the same as by Piaget: interiorization of social norms brings consequently change in motivation of their fulfilment.

¹⁶ Totalitarian system and conventional type of moral are two sides of the same coin, mutually supporting each other.

was something absolutely negative: it was not ignorance but absolute absence of thinking. He was completely helpless if he was short on his proved routine procedures and his examinations looked as a horror, a morbid comedy because of his language full of cliché and phrases (Arendtová, Praha 1995, p. 399)”.

- **Post-conventional stage** of the moral development is reached only by a part of adults, by Kohlberg's research (In Langmeier, 1991) e.g. about 25 % of adult Americans.

The concept presented by Kohlberg did not avoid criticism (similarly as Piaget's concept). Problematic relation of the moral consideration and the moral (real) acting was disputed¹⁷. Several psychologists considered Kohlberg's concept to be “*a cold, dehumanized and rather separated from life diversity and subject experience (Kotásková, 1987: 54)”*; then many authors specialized in this field were led to **orientation to the principles of altruism generally and specifically to issues of the pro-social behaviour**, to the factors influencing assistance for others, support of weaker subjects, generosity, cooperation ability etc. This concept was also criticised for enormous orientation to men (or boys) and for non-respecting of the alternative woman way of the moral consideration which put far more accent on taking care of others¹⁸. For all that, still today the Kohlberg's theory represents not only a valuable base of methods to diagnose the moral development but also a contributing stimulant in pedagogical practice. Majority of professionals agree that this theory is, without dispute, a suitable base for authors of **programs of moral education for children** (Fontana, 1997).

One of critical reservation about Kohlberg's method for tracing the moral development levels of children has concerned themes and contents of the stories submitted as dilemmas. The stories usually produced mostly unpleasant matters: thefts, ill-usage, punishments etc. Then responses of children put a false picture of the child consideration level when substantiating the “good behaviour”, especially the helping, pro-social behaviour. **Eisenberg** (1986) used the stories with another sort of dilemmas (with more accent on help, motivation to the helping behaviour and similar). Based on responds of children she formulated a construction of five stages of pro-social consideration of

¹⁷ Relation between moral consideration and moral acting is problematic, of course – Kohlberg himself recognized it, too. He insisted on indication of research results by that the correlation exists between the stage of moral consideration and real behaviour (Hunt, 2000).

¹⁸ **Carol Gilligan**, the Kohlberg's co-worker and colleague, criticises his theory for a small perceptiveness of differences between male and female moral considerations; by Gilligan, Kohlberg's “moral of justice“ does not sufficiently respect specific female elements of moral consideration. Women react to moral dilemmas more within “moral of care and interest in other people“ by emphasizing personal relationships and care for another human and so they are weakened in Kohlberg's concept in comparison with men who are referring to abstract ethical principles, e.g. justice, fairness etc. By Gilligan the woman speaks in „different voice“. Her mostly known work “*In a Different Voice*“ was published in 1982 in London). However, Gilligan does not put this “female moral“ above the male one, she considers the both morals to be equal in structure; moreover the both modes exist in the major part of people in consideration of moral problems (Čermák, 1991).

children whose general line corresponds, to a certain extent, with those of Kohlberg (Fontana, 1997: 237):

1. Hedonistic, egocentric orientation (of preschool children and some younger school children). By decision-making on aid the children are guided by expected consequences for themselves, not by consideration for the others.
2. Orientation focused on needs (some preschool children and the major part of children at 1st grade of elementary school). Consideration for other children is expressed but there are not many reflections on necessary actions, not many evidences of internalized values.
3. Orientation focused on approval and interpersonal relationships or stereotypic orientation (some children at 1st grade and some older children). The children help others because it is expected from them, because it is a social convention or they can gain in popularity.
- 4a. Self-reflecting empathic orientation (some pupils at 2nd grade and some pupils at secondary schools). Manifestations of compassion and acceptance of the role of the assisting person.
- 4b. Transitive level (some pupils at 2nd grade of primary schools, some pupils at secondary schools and some adults). Here the assistance to others is based on internalized norms, on individual's self-evaluation in this context.
5. Strongly internalized norms (rarely pupils at 2nd grade, some pupils at secondary schools and some adults). The assistance is based on strongly internalized norms and values (e.g. self-respect, responsibility, dignity, assistance as a values itself).

The link between moral maturity and pro-sociability was checked empirically; here we would like to remind some important results: Eisenberg proved in several experiments that children and adolescents who show a mature moral consideration (in sense of Kohlberg's theory) manifest higher measure of helping behaviour than their coevals whose moral consideration corresponds to the lower development stage. Further, it was proved that adults at the higher moral development stages assisted people in need evidently more than the others, **also in the case if the helping activity conflicted with instructions of a person in position of authority** (this "disobedience" can be interpreted quite easily as a manifestation of a higher moral autonomy). In additional research a significant connection of the higher level of the moral maturity (by Kohlberg) was found with cooperativeness, willingness to help, willingness to share, readiness to protect a potential victim from injustice. Also a significant connection was confirmed between pro-sociability and the moral maturity by Piaget. Based on these facts, Eisenberg concluded that the moral maturity stage is a statistically significant, strong predictor of the pro-social behaviour (which likewise corresponds with the fact that moral is a motivating source of pro-sociability).

In pedagogical level the basic significant issue is, **how the moral development** (the development of pro-sociability) **can be supported, facilitated in education**. Relatively high attention has been continuously paid to this issue. Majority of answers of this key question is focused on intentional educational procedures, based on one of theories of learning (e.g. pedagogical constructivism is very useful in this sense) or on one of psy-

choanalytical concepts. Basic pedagogical fundamentals connected with pro-sociability are sensitivity to feelings and attitudes of the others, support of empathy, using induction and substantiation, child's possibility to play different roles in groups for supporting respect to the others, modelling of pro-sociability of facilitation situations and formation of competence to help another person – which are the educational practices respected by all theorists, cognitivists, supporters of the learning and socio-cognitivists, too. Intentional education procedures are very important in this sense; for the personal moral development also such experience is no less important which is obtained by a person acting in social groups playing a key role in his/her life. *“For the child the decisive influence is given by a real, everyday, repeating, unintentional, but surely authentic interaction among all members in the family. If there is a group where people can freely and frankly communicate their own feelings and wishes (authentic solidarity), then the child can develop more easily and individually the “autonomous” moral of higher type. The child is aware that his/her actions can have a good or a bad effects on the other people and that those people can subconsciously help or damage to him/her; in this way the child can more easily understand general moral principles. On the contrary, in communities without development of mutual empathy, where each community member is living for own benefit (lack of solidarity) or people only pretend understanding in communication, although their feelings are different (pseudo-empathy), the moral development can stagnate on the lower “heteronomous” stage (Langmeier, 1983: 123)”. For a child the school is a significant place of social learning, its first “agora“ for learning democracy; here the child learns to share the school room with other children. Indirect but effective support of the moral development can be also creation of atmosphere of **understanding, tolerance, solidarity and fair community at school.***

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PROSOCIÁLNOST V KONTEXTU PODPORY ZDRAVÍ VE ŠKOLE

Souhrn: Problematika podpory zdravých vztahů mezi lidmi má hlubokou souvislost s tématy osobní morálky (resp. jejího vývoje) a prosociálního chování (resp. jeho facilitace). Biopsychosociální model zdraví má tedy bezesporu etickou dimenzi. V tomto příspěvku se budeme zabývat různými koncepcemi morálního vývoje, některými protektivními i rizikovými pedagogicko-psychologickými faktory vývoje osobní morálky a naznačíme možnosti podporovat ve školním prostředí tuto nesmírně složitou cestu člověka ke zdraví – ve smyslu morální zralosti a prosociálnosti. Zmíníme též souvislost podpory prosociálního chování dětí s prevencí šikanování v dětských skupinách.

Klíčová slova: prosociálnost, prosociální chování, osobní morálka, prevence šikanování, „mlčící většina“, konformita, prevence šikanování, realizace vývoje morálky, různá psychologická pojetí vývoje prosociálnosti, facilitace prosociálního chování dětí, spravedlivé společenství ve škole.