



# Political Aspects of CEE-Countries Participation in American Anti-Terrorism Campaign (2001–2011)

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*The paper deals with the political moments of CEE countries participation in American anti-terrorist and military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the course of these events, it accentuates the bilateral relationships between four countries of Visegrad group with the USA, with the focus on the participation of Poland and Czech Republic that presented some different, although controversial patterns of support of American policy. The paper clearly shows the remoteness of international terrorist threat in the region that is irrelevant with active participation of the region in outer campaigns in Asia, with dubious rationale and consequences. As a result this paper is the attempt to consolidate the conclusions of other (predominantly local) works on the issue, but also to generalize this issue from the historical perspective; and is the additional contribution to the whole picture of American anti-terrorist campaign in the first decade of XXI century. Thus the background of terrorism in the region is contemplated through the context of American anti-terrorist policy along with the reforms of anti-terrorist system of these states after “September 11”. Indeed, main point of the work is the comparative approach to analyzing the contribution of Poland and Czech Republic to the anti-terrorist campaign.*

Key words: USA; anti-terrorist; terrorism; CEE; Poland; Czech Republic

## INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of new XXI-st century the escalation of terrorism prompted the comprehensive anti-terrorist campaign by the United States. But history showed that this wave of terrorism also touched the Western Europe. So the recent decade could be called the terrorist decade as the anti-terrorist discourse was prevailing in many parts of the world. The counter-terrorist actions turned out to be the important part of modern security system, and captured the attention of UN, USA, EU and other prominent actors in the world arena. The issue of terrorism

prevention or reducing it to the appropriate level became the foremost task of nowadays security conceptions and strategies. The different law-enforcement, intelligence, cooperative, financing, and military mechanisms were contemplating as the solution of the new urgent problem. So once in the background of history the subject of terrorism became apparent driving force and stimulus of many changes in the leading democratic countries. Some regions due to this wave of terrorism appeared the new hotbed of conflicts, as it happened in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In this time the Central-Eastern Europe had its own agenda, as it had own transformative democratic and integrative changes, and seemed to be far from such controversial issue as terrorism. But even this "unterrorist" territory was absorbed by the common wave of terrorism hysteria, as the terrorist issue was introduced to the policy discourse and documents that led to practical engagement in anti-terrorism measures. Such policy quickly became controversial enough, especially concerning military efforts, visible in anti-terrorist and quasi-anti-terrorist actions (in Afghanistan and Iraq). This situation poses additional challenge due to some paradox that, disengaged to the terrorism region, partially appeared at the forefront of comprehensive anti-terrorist campaign. But such this approach was finely adjusted to the historical memory of these countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), that were familiar with "enemies of communism", and then with stark disapproval of communism itself, and now acquired the new image of enemy.

Thus this paper explores the connections of anti-terrorist posture of CEE-countries with the American counter-terrorist policy in the period of 2001–2011. It accentuates the political issues of the topic, without detailing into the military and technical matters of bilateral cooperation of this region with the USA. So paper contemplates such issues as: the terrorism awareness and environment in the region, anti-terrorist policy of V4-countries and its connections with the relevant policy of the EU and the USA. The last issue appeared the main for the paper due to the controversial nature of cooperation of Central-Eastern Europe with the USA in the military context of the counter-terrorist policy. As a result, this study is projected to test the pros and cons (gains and losses) of such approach in the obvious context of subjective and short-sighted vision of the issue at the regional level, and to compare the results of the cooperation among these countries.

This subject appeared very interesting as for political, but also for historical science. Among the background works for the paper it should

be noted about publications of C. Adamczak<sup>1</sup>, J. Janicki<sup>2</sup>, V. Řiháčková<sup>3</sup>, A. Gogolewska<sup>4</sup>, M. Mareš<sup>5</sup>, S. Kamiński<sup>6</sup>, K. Recawek<sup>7</sup>, G. Lederer<sup>8</sup>, A. Spencer<sup>9</sup>, which are dedicated to the different issues of the topic among the academic, as well the administration community, that proves the theoretical and practical significance of such paper. Most of these authors are of local origin that underlines prevailing local interest to the topic, despite international nature of contemplated issues. The study is also based on the primary sources (reports to the UN, sociological surveys, political statements and declarations by local, European, and American leaders). Thus this paper presents distinct image in general picture of the American anti-terrorist policy after the September 11, attacks.

The research is confined by 2001–2011 chronologically due to the escalation of the issue in the 2001, and have eventual time limit of 2011, when the American authorities eliminated the main person of contemporary terrorism (Osama Bin Laden). These events appeared the natural frontier of so called “war on terror” that embraces such events as September 11 attacks, Afghan (2001) and Iraq (2003) war, and also influenced the anti-terrorist reforms in the EU after terrorist wave in 2004–2005. Indeed the main discussion is revolved about the first part of this period, when the terrorist issue was prevalent in international discourse. By logic, homogenous Central Eastern European countries should have a few connections to these events, but were engaged directly to the global anti-terrorist campaign. First of all, four countries of

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<sup>1</sup> Adamczak, C. (2007): Poland's Engagement in the Global War on Terrorism. In *Strategic Level Political and Military Implications*, U.S. Army War College, [www.dtic.mil](http://www.dtic.mil)

<sup>2</sup> Janicki, J.: The United States and Poland: Coalition of the Willing and Beyond In *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*. p. 69–102.

<sup>3</sup> Řiháčková, V. (2006): *Counterterrorism policies in Central Europe*. EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, [www.europeum.org](http://www.europeum.org)

<sup>4</sup> Gogolewska, A. (2005): *Polish war on terror: external roots, internal dynamics and ambitions to become global player*; [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

<sup>5</sup> Mareš, M. (2008): *Consequences of EU enlargement for terrorism? European Expert Network in Terrorism*. Issues conference. Leiden: Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Leiden University, Campus the Hague; <http://ispo.fss.muni.cz>

<sup>6</sup> Kamiński, S. (2002): *Polska w międzynarodowej koalicji przeciwko terroryzmowi*. Warszawa (2011).

<sup>7</sup> *Non-military aspects of security in V4 countries – prospects for co-operation*. Edited by Rekawec K. Warszawa: The Polish Institute Of International Affairs: V4Papers, No. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Lederer, G. (2005): Countering Islamist Radicals In Eastern Europe: CSRC discussion paper 05/42, September 2005; [www.investigativeproject.org](http://www.investigativeproject.org)

<sup>9</sup> Spencer, A. (2006): Counter-terrorism in New Europe. In *International Public Policy Review*, Vol. 2, No.2, November 2006. p. 92-112.; <http://www.ucl.ac.uk>

Visegrad Group (except the Czech Republic to the some extent) were steady allies of the USA, taking part in military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Secondly, this region was at the core of integration to the NATO (1999), and then to the EU (2004). Thirdly, the most active ally of the USA in the campaign appeared Poland that is regional leader and biggest country of the region-so the main discussion and results in the paper is referred to this country. But it doesn't allow to call this paper the case-study of Poland, as the specific role and position of Czech Republic hinder the opportunity to make the unilateral conclusions for the whole region. Moreover, Czech Republic and Slovakia showed certain inertia in global anti-terrorism regime (resolutions), so it allows the researcher conclude only provisionally about similarities of anti-terrorist policy of region.

## TERRORISM IN THE REGION: HISTORY, POLITICS, COUNTER-POLICY

In general the region is unfamiliar with the terrorism, but remembers empires and communist and empires rule. Thus, the absence of terrorism doesn't mean that region was without historical wounds. Oppositely, the region situated at the epicenter of geopolitical rivalry that produced the wave of hatred and xenophobia that stipulated the different irredentist and social movements that fortunately hardly applied to the terrorist methods. This aspect is more visible in Poland with some sporadic events. Its history knew the bombings against tsar rule (in Russian empire), nationalist bombings in the interwar period (1920-th), and similar events at the beginning of 1990s<sup>10</sup>. The absence of extremism in latter part of XX century was caused by unviolent approach of local anti-communist opposition, despite the support of some controversial international extremists by local communist regimes. In 1990-th after the dissolution of communist block, the Tamil, the Palestinian, the Kurdish and the Irish radicals unsuccessfully tried to establish the own bases in the region. That proves that region appeared in the sight of nationalistic terrorists due to the changes in the geopolitical map and relaxation of barriers to the international migration.

Hungary has also undergone some minor internal terrorist incidents. In 1998 the terrorist bombing in the Budapest took several lives and similar event lead to the injurements in 2003. The recent attacks against Roma population showed the feature of ethnic terrorism, uncommon for

<sup>10</sup> Kamiński, S.: op. cit.; Gogolewska, A.: op. cit., p. 3.

democratic Europe. At the beginning of XXI century the nationals of this country also appeared the victims of terrorism abroad (in Kashmir, Iraq, London, Egypt, Turkey)<sup>11</sup>. The last fact confirms the common threat of modern terrorism that is more visible in the case of Poland that, solely among region, had the victim in WTC terrorist attacks, as well as in Madrid and Bali explosions. In 2007 there was even incident with the intent to kill Polish ambassador in Iraq.

Other important factor of non-terrorist character of the region was its non-nuclearity. Despite the situation changed and Poland ascended to the nuclear programme in 2009, complementing three Czech nuclear plants, the control measures were finely adjusted to the dangers of possible terrorist connections. Among anti-proliferation measures it could be mentioned the detention of two Ukrainian and one Hungarian nationals in Slovakia with a kilogram of uranium in 2006 that reminds the similar event in Czech Republic in 1994.

Probably the main factors that determined the unterrorism nature of the region are their monoethnic societies, homogenous national structure, and especially the absence of gross Muslim minority in the CEE-states. For example, neighboring Belarus (50 thousands of Moslems) surpass Poland with its 25 thousands Arab community and 4 thousands of Tatars. The quantity of such community in other countries of region is even smaller: in Czech Republic – 10 thousand, Slovakia – 5 thousands<sup>12</sup>, and no more than 20 thousands Moslem community in Hungary. It should be also mentioned that Slovakia even lack the mosque in its territory<sup>13</sup> and Hungary do not have officially registered Moslem religious community. Such low religious profile is incomparable with the Moslem community in Germany (several million), Bulgaria (1 million), and even Ukraine (half of million). Indeed, the religious feature is very important in Poland, where the Catholicism is at the center of the national life and the historical memory. Thus, the Moslem proselytism in such countries as Poland is improbable, but due to the integration to multinational EU, such prospect is more obvious in other countries of the region. For example, unlike Poland, Czech Republic differs in light of religiosity as the fewest one.

The other internal factors distinctly determine the counter-terrorism environment in these countries. For example, Islamophobia and anti-semitism is partially strong factors there. The adjacent feature of local

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<sup>11</sup> Marton, P.: Anti-terrorism in the Visegrad Framework: Less is More and Better. In *Non-military aspects...*, p. 20.

<sup>12</sup> Lederer, G.: op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>13</sup> Rekawec, K.: The Threat of Terrorism to the Visegrad Group Countries. In *Non-military aspects...*, p. 26.

population is the low-level of respect of civil and personal rights during the conducting of counterterrorist measures. But in this respect it should be noted that there were no profound sociological survey of the issue, so the numbers in such research differ enormously concerning the public opinion on terrorism. Some authors even expressively show their skepticism about the urgency of regional counterterrorism. For example, Agnieszka Gogolewska critically summarizes the terrorism issue in the higher level of society of Poland, pointing out to the lack of profound discussion about the problems. She concludes that "security awareness of Polish elites seemed stopped at the stage of NATO enlargement and development of friendly relations in the region"<sup>14</sup>. She also stresses that her country entered the Global War on Terror (official name of American anti-terrorist campaign) in hasty manner (without strategy, aims, reliable calculations) and without due analysis – the claim that must be applicable for the whole region. But it consequently did not hinder these countries to take part in controversial military campaign.

As it mentioned above the non-occurrence of terrorism is explained by controlled right-wing militancy, the absence of left-wing militancy and the absence of social and logistical basis for Moslem radicals. But the alliances with other western countries, especially the USA, made the countries direct object of terrorism potentially. Yet in 1998, Osama Bin Laden declared about duty to eradicate Americans and their allies, and Iraq seemingly aggravated the situation, taking into account the participation of Poland (2,200 troops), Slovakia (110 persons), Hungary (300 troops), and 200 Czechs (in British zone of command). That is also proved by the statement of Ayman Zawahiri (one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda) that called Poland twice and Hungary once – as the occupiers of Iraq. The information about Al-Zarqawi network in the region, and disproved Czech statements about the links of September 11 attacks and Iraq added additional controversy to the terrorism issue in the region.

### **MODES OF POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT OF COUNTERTERRORISM**

Due to the absence of internal sources of terrorism, the external factors determined the external forms of counter-terrorist policy of the region, which was actively engaged in integration to NATO and EU, and in 2001 received the new global task – fighting terrorism. That is why; the

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<sup>14</sup> Gogolewska, A.: op. cit., p. 5.

September 11 attacks influenced the security sector of these countries and stipulated the adoption of the new security strategies that acknowledged the foremost character of new threat. But due to the unfamiliarity and remoteness of the new issues, the region applied the copycat strategy to the counter-terrorism, copying the conceptual basis from the USA and institutional capacity from EU. The last thing is revealed through that being the new members of EU, these countries took over the whole set of specific EU-mechanisms against terrorism and the first review of implementation process of these measures in 2004–05 gave rather positive appreciation concerning the Czech and Poland. But again popular anxiety at its peak in Europe (in 2005–2006) showed in-congruent scarce figures here. When the general European level of imminent terrorist danger surpassed the 10–14 %, the figures in V4-countries were less impressive: 2–5 % in Czech Republic, 2 % in Hungary, 3 % – in Poland, and 5–3 % in Slovakia. Moreover, despite the vision of this issue in the light of internal security, absolute majority of people (90%) considered these issues as the object of cooperative measures (unlike in the UK and Spain where the figures were a few higher than 60 %) <sup>15</sup>.

EU brought the cooperative mechanisms in anti-terrorist actions that stressed on special action plans (programs), border control, document checks, sharing intelligence, finances monitoring, Europol, Eurojust, the competence of Special Coordinator (created in 2004), and even favored Poland by locating the center of European Border Agency in Warsaw. But institutional reforms and changes was not supported by special law against terrorism that was adopted for instance in neighboring Ukraine (2003).

As a result bureaucracy hindered much of the anti-terrorist activity. In Poland, it was the issue of personnel reduction in Internal Affairs Ministry, and its rivalry for mandate with Defense Ministry. At the competence level the main anti-terrorist entity in this country was Agency of Internal Security (AIS), but such competence mandate was faced with vague tasks and definitions, lack of relevant authority. In 2002 there were created the anti-terrorism center with coordinating mission, but also with lack of the authority. Other important entity (WIR10) with anti-terrorist mission existed only two years. Another anti-terrorist measures in Poland after September 11 comprised the creation of sanctions commission, ratification of anti-terrorist conventions, tightening export control, conducting anti-terrorist conference in November 2001 <sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Řiháčková, V.: op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>16</sup> Adamczak, C.: op. cit., p. 12.

Poland, after Iraq war, along with the USA, actively focused at the counter-proliferation of WMD, but through European mechanisms. For example, in 2008, Poland became a signatory of new European guidelines in this field (that was significant addition to the European strategy against terrorism, where the issue of proliferation of WMD was present). That year was also manifested by two other institutional events in Poland. The Government security centre was created within Interior Ministry that was empowered to analyze terrorist threat and handle crisis management. There was also created CAD (Counter-terrorist centre) that acquired the coordinating role in anti-terrorist system of Poland and should also analyze terrorist threats, as in Poland either in neighboring countries that impacted polish strategic security interests<sup>17</sup>. These creation of these institution and attention to WMD is the evidence of Polish aspiration to make the countering the terrorist one of the priority tasks, that was direct influence of American policy, despite the lowering of terrorist hysteria in the end of previous decade.

Unlike Poland Czech Republic chose more moderate approach to the support of global anti-terrorist campaign that more resembled the position of Baltic States. This country focused on the role of national action plan against terrorism. It also approved national security strategy as in the case of Poland. But leadership of the country showed pendulum effect toward the support of the USA, without steady and successive policy on issue. The obvious reason for that was the absence of terrorist threat for the country that led to strong neglecting the issue among populace and rather controversial declaration of government about "impossibility of absolute security". In the case of Security Information Agency (BIS) it could be seen groundless statement about the meeting between Mohamed Atta (main September 11 hijacker) and Iraqi representative in April of 2001. This agency was the main in the framework of Czech anti-terrorist bodies, along with auxiliary departments, financial police, central and local police, but also without support of specific anti-terrorist legislation. The less impressive is also the bilateral Czech agreements on terrorism, comparably with Poland, confined more to the EU countries. In the field of international anti-terrorist regime the Czech Republic also ratified relatively less conventions. Other Czech anti-terrorist efforts were indeed complemented by set of effective internal measures (tightening border control, security measures in Airports, sky-marshals to the USA

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<sup>17</sup> Report of the Republic of Poland on the resolution: „Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” (A/RES/63/30); [http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport\\_Terrorism/Docs/Poland.pdf](http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/Docs/Poland.pdf)



and Israel, protection of “nuclear sites”). But as in the case of Poland, Czech anti-terrorist system also lacked strict hierarchical structure and had vague competence.

The other two countries (Hungary and Slovakia) have more similarities with Czech Republic, but supported the USA steadier, especially in the field of military operations. In this context it should be noted that these countries as a Czech Republic was in process of transferring to volunteer armies. In Hungary it happened in 2004, one year before then in Czech Republic. In Slovakia this process was taken more time. In general, the anti-terrorist position of Hungary was defined by its proximity to the Balkans, so the task of border control appeared prevalent. The Slovakia also implemented the military approach to the international anti-terrorist activity that allowed getting new experience in relatively far regions, out of Europe.

Hungary and Slovakia also adopted new security strategies that were very similar in theoretical underpinning borrowed rather from the USA than EU, as it proved by focus on the acknowledgment of NATO as security. The security strategy of Slovakia singled out two main threats such as terrorism and WMD proliferation. The last issue was also projected to solve with disarming methods (due to the high risk of using WMD by terrorist)<sup>18</sup> that could be ample reference to the Iraqi case. Hungarian security strategy also referred to the NATO (and EU) as the main cooperative means to counter terrorism, indicating the strategic threat on the part of combination of WMD and terrorism (that was early accentuated by Bush administration before war in Iraq). This strategy is also predominantly American-centric as it clearly supported the American military presence in the Europe<sup>19</sup>.

## POLAND'S PRO-ACTIVE ROLE IN THE AMERICAN “WAR ON TERROR”

The manner of Poland-American relationships is defined by their history. With mighty neighbors, Germany and Russia, Poland was forced to seek another, more external ally. The key ally after Cold War appeared the USA that was connected with history of Poland from the times of Tadeusz Kosciuszko, through the policy of Woodrow Wilson, Cold War, along with such American policy-makers as Zbigniew Brzeziński who

<sup>18</sup> Ondrejcsak, R. (2006): Security Policies of the Slovak Republic and Hungary – the “Limited Differentiation” in Central Europe. *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, Vol. XV, No. 3–4, p. 80.

<sup>19</sup> The same, p. 81.

reflects the strength of Polish Diaspora in the USA. So it is no surprise that Poland was among the first ones that supported American policy after September 11. Polish leadership also organized the anti-terrorism conference for CEE region in November of 2001, where a lot of Bush rhetoric was reiterated by Polish president Alexander Kwaśniewski<sup>20</sup>. This conference was the sign support of central European region of the USA in the hard times, especially on the part of Polish leadership. Then, Poland actively engaged in UN anti-terrorist regime, supporting WMD-terrorism initiatives and was also the place (Krakow), where Container Security Initiative (CSI) was first declared by American president. Most contradictory situation about Polish pro-American support appeared after the information (in the end of 2005) about the existing the secret detention American centers on Polish territory.

As a result at the beginning of XXI century the USA appeared "number one" ally for Poland, when the Polish state became the most steadfast ally of the USA at international arena on other hand. The main driving force of such engagement was Polish policy-makers, even with communist background, when the popular support was scarcer. In September 2001, the every second Pole considered that Poland could be the object of terrorist attack. The situation with Iraq campaign was even meager, mostly due to the absence of colonial history, as the society did not see it as necessary to intervene overseas. Only 30 % favored the invasion, whose quantity rose up after invasion (50 %), but then dropped even lower for the next three years<sup>21</sup>. So the Polish active engagement reflects its dichotomy at the background of strong national fears about terrorism. Even National Security Strategy of 2007 mentions terrorism 30 times<sup>22</sup>. But, despite the obvious anxiety about terrorism and even the fears of World War due to it, the issue itself did not find interest among political parties, that proves the conformist approach to the issue among policy-makers.

Poland definitely adopted the concept of American vision of terrorism and copied it to its own Security Strategy (2003) that proposed the holistic view of security in favor of terrorism and WMD threat. It was the exaggeration in some measure, but also probably the justification of Polish participation in Iraq – and the tool to play more active role in the world<sup>23</sup> but to be in larger risk of terrorism threat. As a result this

<sup>20</sup> *Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism (2001)*, November 6; <http://www.washington.polemb.net>

<sup>21</sup> Adamczak, C., op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>22</sup> *Transnational Terrorism (2008). Theoretical Approaches and Policy Discourse*, 12 November; <http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu>

controversy deteriorated the relations with France, Germany. The main rationale of such policy was desire of Polish leadership of political and economical gains, among which security guarantees, economic cooperation, financial support, Visa Waiver programme, and potential for growing state image were the prevailing. But public opinion required even more, so the following controversy around “anti-ballistic shield” and “black sites” came as no surprise. This situation also seemed to prove that EU is contemplated more as economic facilitator for Poland, than political or military force. The relatively positive moment for Poland in Iraq campaign was its army experience in real combat situation, whose practice was absent since the World War II. For five years, 15 thousands of Polish soldiers took part in security operations in Iraq (with more than 20 lost and about 100 injured), their military received new vehicles and weapons, applied the lighter infantry, new doctrines and field manuals, along with the changes in tactics and acquired experience in non-linear attacks and defense.

Polish approach clearly reflected in the words of W. Cimoszewicz that casting away the “passivity as the solutions” and satisfied the ambitions for Poland as strong regional leader as Poland ruled the whole divisions there with other nations under its command. But another declaration of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (Polish foreign minister) in July 2003 about the processing of oil field turned to be vain, so the economic gains in Iraq appeared void. Thus, military experience controversy also proves by the stark critique of Paul Bremer (command-in-chief in Iraq) that assessed low about the strength of Central European troops<sup>24</sup>. It should be also mentioned the Afghan mission of Poles, who conducted security operations, revealed the dangerous materials, particularly doing mine-clearing there.

### CZECH UNEVEN ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN ANTI-TERRORIST EFFORTS

Czech Republic appeared the most reluctant supporter of American anti-terrorist efforts among countries of the region, but its role in Iraq remained controversial, but not due to the loyalty to American policy. The

<sup>23</sup> Zaborowski, M – Longhurst, L. (2003): America's Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader. In *International Affairs*, 79, 5. p. 1009–1028.

<sup>24</sup> Wysakowski-Walter, J. (2011): Between Europe and America: Polish Choices for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, March; <http://www.unilodz.academia.edu>

pace of support of American intervention in Iraq was not consecutive, its engagement there were modest, and disproved assertions of Czech leaderships about the meeting of Iraqi agents and “September 11” terrorist in Prague were the main contribution to it.

At the end of 2001, the Radio Free Europe appeared at the center of debate between Czech and American authorities. Despite the decision to relocate, the location remained unchanged, despite it could be the object for terrorists as the symbol of western propaganda in Near East (as the radio signal was directed exactly in that region from Prague). Besides Czech Republic was known supporter of Israel policy, that was also exploited in Moslem propaganda (and even by left- and right wing Czech radicals that tried sporadically to help Islamism organization, despite general anti-Moslem orientation of right-wing groups). The personal affinity also played role at that time as head of Czech state, despite the position of government and parliament, joined the camp of supporters of anti-terrorist operation in Iraq. At the start of 2003, outgoing president, and former dissident, Václav Havel signed “Letter of 8” (with other seven heads of European states), about the support of invasion into Iraq. It was the sign of strict pro-American position on the part of Czech president, as the successive leadership took more balanced policy that was visible at February (2003) summit, when Czech authorities withdrew controversial statement of Cyril Svoboda (Czech deputy prime minister) toward the EU, after the critique from so-called “Old Europe” (Western European countries, according to famous statement of Donald Rumsfeld at that times). The position of “Old Europe” was clearly visible in the case of J. Chirac, French president, who pointed at improper behavior of states-candidates for EU, which, for his mind, should be quiet, and even warned about the threat of barring of EU accession for central European states. As a result, these states were excluded from the European summit, where common position on Iraq was elaborating. This situation showed rift between old and new members of EU that was illogical and inappropriate, before the next wave of EU enlargement. It was the result of new member's aspirations to play active role in future EU, and more idealistic worldview favored to the USA policy.

But compromise decision was found, despite inter-state tensions and collisions. The Czech case was also relieved by change of president and its position toward American policy and by the fact that contradictions with Western Europe policy were slightest exactly in the case of Czech state. New president Václav Klaus (2003–2013) was against the invasion to Iraq and even had the verbal conflict with American ambassador. This position was the reflection of national Czech opinion that favored the

coordinating the policy with the EU (75%), unlike with the USA (37%). But American influence was significant, and in the end of March (2003), Czech president pleaded vaguely about the support the American coalition and stressed on the need of amplifying trans-Atlantic relationships. V. Klaus explained his position that he was against confrontation with US and dilemma between Europe and the USA during visit in Germany in April of 2003<sup>25</sup>. Such statement was reiteration of early prime-minister statement, V. Špidla, about the position of Czech Republic in the midst of EU and the US. In the course of time the pro-American position of Czech Republic preserved as it supported pro-American approach about solely NATO defense structures in EU. In 2006 Czech Rep. took even more pro-American stance, supporting the idea of Antimissile Shield at its territory, but due to the public opposition and its failed ratification in parliament in 2008, and consecutive decision of Barack Obama to change its location, the plans were canceled.

Unlike the Iraq engagement, Czech Republic took relatively active participation in Afghanistan. The first round of security mission (ISAF) lasted in 2002–2005. Then, there were the missions of meteorological service (2004–2007), military and police in the Southern regions of the country (2007–2009). One hundred and twenty Czechs soldiers took part in anti-terrorist Operation Enduring Freedom (initial name of American anti-terrorist campaign) in 2004–2006. But more humanitarian orientation of Czech participation in Afghanistan was underscored by participation in Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Badakhshan (2005–2007) and in Logar (2008) province, which focused at administration, social work, and security<sup>26</sup>.

## CONCLUSIONS

New century along with the Euro-Atlantic integration brought new challenge for the region. Despite low level of terrorist threat to the region, obvious disinterest of the region in the eyes of international terrorism, there are reasons to say about terrorist danger in the Central Eastern Europe. The main reason is the active participation of countries of the

<sup>25</sup> Baum, D. – Marek, D. (2010): Czech Foreign Policy and EU Integration: European and Domestic Sources. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 8–9.

<sup>26</sup> Hynek, N. (2010): The Czech Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan: Context, Experience and Politics. *Defence Studies*, Volume 10, Issue 3, p. 413; <http://www.tandfonline.com>

region in American anti-terrorist campaign in the past and confirmed threat statements by leaderships of Al-Qaeda. The other conclusion of the research proves the absence of internal and reliable basis for terrorism in the region, the low level of compliance of counter-terrorist actions among the populace, and two-fold nature of regional actions against terrorism – that gripped the American counter-terrorism and European anti-terrorism. The first one proposed the militarized and severe response, the second – accentuated on the law-enforcement means and international cooperation. Most probably to the totalitarian past, the countries of region prevailed the military actions, as more visible and effective means that took place in relatively far Asian region, out of Europe borders. But, despite similar approach and basis, the countries showed different dynamics, especially visible in the case of Poland and Czech Republic that indicated different degree of support of American position, but both ones appeared controversial due to the connections to Iraq invasion. Position of CEE-countries (except hardly the Czech state) led to the obvious divide of Europe for “pro-American” and “pro-European” ones in 2003 before the biggest wave of enlargement, that probably appeared the trait of uncalculated policy of CEE-countries that had enough ambitions, and favored the distant ally than closer one. The appropriate anti-terrorist policy of region also shows about transfer of foreign patterns of policy in certain field, with very dubious rationale, that creating the vision about over-dependency on somebody’s policy.